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Abstract
We ask: how much of the observed wage dispersion, among similar
workers, can be explained by a lack of coordination among employers in
their hiring practices? To answer this, we construct a directed search
model with homogenous workers where ﬁrms can create either good or
bad jobs, are uncoordinated with their job oﬀers, and where on-the-
job search is possible. Workers can exploit ex post opportunities when
determining wages. The stationary equilibrium has both productivity
dispersion - diﬀerent wages due to diﬀerent job qualities, and contract
dispersion - diﬀerent wages due to diﬀerent market experiences for
workers, and is constrained-eﬃcient. Job arrival rates are endogenous
and, as found in empirical studies, smaller for on-the-job searchers than
for unemployed workers. We calibrate the model to the US economy
and compare the implied statistics with those for empirical data. The
equilibrium wage distribution is hump shaped, skewed signiﬁcantly to
the right, and, with baseline parameters, generates residual dispersion
statistics 75-90% the size of those found empirically. However, the
model overestimates the values of job ﬁnding rates and underestimates
the average duration of unemployment.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that a large proportion of wage disparity cannot be explained
by diﬀerences in the observed characteristics of workers. As a stylised fact,
approximately two thirds of wage dispersion is “residual” - occuring within
narrowly deﬁned groups of workers. (See, for example, Katz and Autor
(1999).) This has always posed a challenge to theory - particularly in light
of Diamond’s (1971) critique of wage dispersion, in equilibrium, with homo-
geneous workers. For this reason, several researchers have attributed this
dispersion to unobserved heterogeneity among workers, with the implication
that more detailed observations could ultimately resolve the issue.
Search theorists, on the other hand, have sought to explain this phe-
nomenon as an equilibrium outcome with workers who are, in fact, homoge-
neous. Burdett and Judd (1983), for example, explore two variants of search
that allow for equilibrium dispersion: non-sequential search and “noisy se-
quential search”. More recently, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) found that
equilibrium wage dispersion occurs in models with on-the-job search and
parametric Poisson arrival rates for job oﬀers. The equilibrium wage distri-
bution implied by their model, however, counterfactually places more den-
sity on higher wages. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) resolve this problem
by introducing productivity dispersion among ﬁrms, and add realism by al-
lowing incumbent ﬁrms to make counteroﬀers to their workers when they
are approached by other ﬁrms, so that a worker’s wage reﬂects her outside
option. This can generate the hump-shaped distributions observed in the
data. They do, however, restort to assuming ex ante heterogeneity among
workers (diﬀerent valuations of leisure), and maintain the assumption that
oﬀer arrival rates are parametric — unaﬀected by market conditions.
In this paper we consider an alternative explanation for residual wage
dispersion: a lack of coordination among employers when choosing candi-
dates to make oﬀers to. We argue that, in the absence of this coordination,
ﬁrms may play mixed strategies when approaching candidates. When these
mixed strategies are played, job oﬀer arrival rates are endogenized, and can
respond to market conditions. Also, diﬀerent workers face diﬀerent ex post
opportunities and, therefore, diﬀerent wage proﬁles — even when workers are
identical ex ante. Furthermore, in mixed strategy equilibria, under certain
reasonable conditions, ﬁrms choose diﬀerent productivity levels for the jobs
that they create — productivity dispersion — introducing a further source
of wage dispersion that does not exist if ﬁrms are able to coordinate their
oﬀers. Particularly in the presence of on-the-job search, this process can
generate wage distributions among ex ante homogeneous agents similar to
those observed empirically: skewed to the right with a hump shape and with
similar dispersion statisitics.
To demonstrate this point we construct a very simple model with iden-
tical workers, and where all ﬁrms are aware of the locations of all workers.
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Each worker has a ﬁxed amount of labor to sell, and sells this labor to the
highest bidder, as long as the wage is at least as high as the worker’s outside
option. Vacancies are created by ﬁrms, at some cost, and ﬁrms must secure
workers to produce output. Once these vacancies are created, ﬁrms choose
which workers to approach. In our model, within any period, ﬁrms can ap-
poach only one worker per vacancy, and ﬁrms’ choices to approach a worker
are simultaneous. Although many asymmetric pure strategy equilibria ex-
ist in this model, all of which dominate mixed strategy equilibria from the
ﬁrms’ point of view, the only symmetric equilibrium is one in which all ﬁrms
play mixed strategies. We characterize the properties of this mixed strategy
equilibrium, both in a static model and in a dynamic model which allows for
on-the-job-search. We then choose parameters to match US weekly wages,
unemployment, and the vacancy rate, and compare the implied wage dis-
persion statistics with those in empirical studies.1
For the static model we identify necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
the coexistence of both high and low productivity jobs in equilibrium. We
provide complete analytical solutions for the endogenous variables, including
the wage distribution, and identify two sources of wage dispersion in equilib-
rium: productivity dispersion (due to diﬀerent job qualities) and contract
dispersion (due to diﬀerent outside ex post opportunities, for workers). How-
ever, since the static model only has one period, workers and vacancies have
only one chance to match. With the urn-ball matching framework generated
here, this implies unrealistically high unemployment rates for any reasonable
parameter values. To evaluate the empirical signiﬁcance of this theory, we
therefore turn to a dynamic model, where workers and vacancies can match
in any period and where matches are separated at a parametric rate.
For the dynamic model we establish the existence of a stationary sym-
metric equilibrium with on-the-job search, and the creation of both types
of jobs in the equilibrium. We show that this equilibrium implies smaller
oﬀer arrival rates for on-the-job searchers than unemployed ones (as em-
pirical studies show). For the calibrated model, we ﬁnd that the standard
deviation of the log wage is approximately 51% of the number reported by
Katz and Autor for the entire wage distribution — 75% the 2/3 attributed,
by them, to residual wage dispersion. However, we ﬁnd that the implied
90 — 10 percentile log wage stastistic is approximately 90% of the value re-
ported in Katz and Autor for the residual distribution. The implied wage
distribution is also hump-shaped and skewed signiﬁcantly to the right, as in
empirical studies.
1As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst attempt to match a directed search model with the
data. Other studies have conducted numerical simulations (see, in particular, Cao and
Shi (2000) and Julien, Kennes and King (2000)) but without speciﬁcally trying to match
moments in the data.
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1.1 Related Literature
The focus on mixed strategy equilibria, when sellers face capacity con-
straints, has a history going back to Peters (1984). Montgomery (1991) ap-
plied this to the labor market, in a setting where ﬁrms play the role of sellers,
posting a wage, and each worker can make only one job application. He also
examined the existence of good and bad jobs in this setting, driving wage
diﬀerentials. In a similar environment, Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) and
Shi (2002a) investigate equilibria in which larger ﬁrms oﬀer higher wages.
Similarly, Shi (2002b) shows that, with skilled and unskilled workers and
skill-biased technology, high productivity ﬁrms will oﬀer higher wages to to
unskilled workers than low productivity ﬁrms — to oﬀset the lower probabil-
ity of being hired in a high productivity job. Acemoglu and Shimer (2000)
analyse a similar model, but with the added feature of nonsequential search:
workers are unable to see posted wages unless they pay a cost to receive a
sample of them.
In Julien, Kennes, and King (2000), as in this paper, workers play the
role of sellers of labor and apply to all existing vacancies. Also, the pricing
mechanism is similar: workers are able to sell their labor to the highest bid-
der. Hence, some wage dispersion exists, in equilibrium, due to the fact that,
ex post, some workers are approached by more ﬁrms than others (contract
dispersion). However, in that paper, all jobs are homogeneous, and the fo-
cus is on the role of reserve wages in ﬁnite-sized economies. We show that,
as market size increases, workers’ reserve wages decrease monotonically to
their outside options in the limit large economy. In Julien, Kennes, and King
(2002a), we draw a link between this wage determination mechanism and
the rule proposed by Mortensen (1982) in the context of cooperative games.
Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2003) demonstrate that, when workers are
able to make multiple applications in the environments considered by Mont-
gomery (1991) and Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), the equilibrium wage
structure mimics the bidding structure we use here. In Julien, Kennes, and
King (2001a) we consider a setting where, in a prior stage of the game,
workers can choose whether to auction or post wages. Collectively, all these
papers have recently come under the heading of “directed search”.2 A com-
mon feature of these models is the endogenous probabilistic matching struc-
ture which has properties similar to the matching functions discussed, for
example, in Pissarides (2000).
Section 2 presents and analyses the static model. The dynamic model is
introduced, and its features are analysed, in Section 3. Section 4 presents
the calibrated version of the model, and Section 5 concludes. The proof of
one of the propositions and its corollary are contained in the Appendix.
2The directed search literature contains several other papers, not all of which have their
roots in this coordination problem. See, for example, Moen (1997). For recent surveys,
see King (2003) and Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2004).
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2 The Static Model
We consider a simple economy with a large number N of identical, risk
neutral, job candidates where each candidate has one indivisible unit of
labor to sell. There are Mi = φiN vacancies of two types: i ∈ {1, 2}, where
φi ≥ 0, and are determined by free entry. The productivity of a worker is
y0 if unemployed (we normalize y0 = 0) and yi > 0 if employed in a job of
type i, where y2 > y1. It costs ki to create a vacancy, where k2 > k1 and
yi > ki ≥ 0 for all i. Each vacancy can approach only one candidate.
3 The
order of play is as follows. Given the number of workers N, Mi vacancies
of each type i enter the market. Once the number of entrants has been
established, vacancies choose which candidate to approach. Once vacancies
have been assigned to candidates, wages are determined through a bidding
game. That is, given the number of vacancies (of each type) that have
approached the worker, the worker conducts an auction to determine which
ﬁrm to work for. We solve the model using backwards induction.
2.1 Wage Determination
Once vacancies have been assigned to candidates, diﬀerent candidates face,
in general, diﬀerent ex post opportunities. Those that have no vacancies
assigned to them are, of course, unemployed and receive only their outside
option y0 = 0. All other candidates allocate their labor according to a bid-
ding game, where each candidate sells his labor to the highest bidder, as
long as the highest bid at least matches the outside option. If only one va-
cancy is assigned to the candidate, then the highest bid will be exactly the
outside option. When at least two vacancies are assigned to the candidate,
the bidding game determines that the candidate works at the vacancy with
the highest valuation for the worker, and is paid the amount of the sec-
ond highest valuation from among the vacancies that have been assigned to
him.4 If, for example, at least two high productivity vacancies are assigned
3The heurisitic justiﬁcation for this assumption, discussed at some length in Julien,
Kennes, and King (2000), is as follows. When ﬁrms make job oﬀers to workers, they are
often committed for some length of time, while the worker considers the oﬀer. We take
this as given, institutionally, in this paper. Thus, if a ﬁrm has only one vacancy, it can
make an oﬀer to, at most, one worker at a time. In the static model there is, of course,
only one time period. This appears as a very strong assumption in this case. However, in
the calibration of the dynamic model below, each period lasts for one week. Thus, when
a ﬁrm makes an oﬀer, the worker can hold that oﬀer for one week. In New Zealand, for
example, labor law requires that ﬁrms give candidates one week to consider oﬀers.
4We justify the usage of this mechanism in following ways. First, we believe that
auction mechanisms are natural to consider in markets where, as here, each buyer expects
to face multiple sellers. In Julien, Kennes, and King (2001a) we show, in a game where
sellers can choose whether to to post prices or to auction with a reserve price, the auction
choice is an equilibrium one. In particular, if they can commit to a mechanism ex ante,
then the auction emerges as the dominant strategy equilibirum. In Julien, Kennes, and
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to the candidate then the candidate will work at one of these jobs (with
equal probablility) and will be paid y2. If, alternatively, only one high pro-
ductivity, and at least one low productivity vacancies, are assigned then the
candidate will work in the high productivity job but will be paid only y1. If
no high productivity vacancies, but at least two low productivity vacancies
are assigned then the candidate will work in one of the low producitivity
jobs (with equal probability) and will be paid y1.
Thus, in equilibrium, the wage wji of a worker who is employed in a job of
productivity i, and whose second best vacancy had productivity j, is given
by:
wji = yj (2.1)
for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}. (For notational convenience, we denote the “wage” of
an unemployed worker to be w00.)
2.2 Frictional Assignment of Vacancies to Workers
We now consider the problem, facing ﬁrms, of which candidates to approach.
All ﬁrms understand the wage determination mechanism, above, that oper-
ates once vacancies have been assigned. Also, all ﬁrms know the numbers
of each type of vacancy that have been created. Firms choose candidates
to approach in a simultaneous move game. As mentioned in the Introduc-
tion, there are many asymmetric pure strategy equilibria, where vacancies
are uniquely assigned to candidates. However, implementation of any one of
these equilibria requires coordination among the ﬁrms. In large economies
such as this, coordination becomes practically impossible. Therefore, as has
become standard in directed search environments, here we restrict our at-
tention to the unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which each
buyer of each type randomizes over sellers (which are identical).5 Conse-
quently, the probability pi that a worker is approached by a vacancy of
maximum productivity yi is given by:
p0 = e
−φ1e−φ2 (2.2a)
p1 = e
−φ2(1− e−φ1) (2.2b)
p2 = (1− e
−φ2) (2.2c)
King (2000), we show that equilibrium reserve wages converge to the outside option as
market size increases. Thus, in large markets such as the one considered in this paper,
the outside option is the equilibrium reserve. Also, work by Lu and McAfee (1996) has
shown that, when sellers can choose selling mechanisms, auctions will drive out bargaining
in the sense that no evolutionary-stable equilibrium with any sellers bargaining exists in
large markets. For further discussion on mechanism selection in similar environments, see
McAfee (1993), Wang (1993), Kultti (1999), Julien, Kennes, and King (2002b), and Coles
and Eeckhout (2003).
5 In this paper we do not model this game explicitly. For a derivation and proof of
existence of this mixed strategy equilibrium, in a more general environment, we refer the
reader to Julien, Kennes, and King (2005).
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2.2.1 Wage Disparity
It also follows that, in a large market, from the pool of vacant jobs of pro-
ductivity yi, a candidate obtains either (i) no oﬀer, (ii) one oﬀer, and (iii)
multiple oﬀers with probabilities e−φi , φie
−φi and, 1−e−φi−φie
−φi , respec-
tively. Therefore, the wage distribution of the static model, Ωs, is given by
the following matrix:
Ωs ≡
[
wji , p
j
i
]
=


w00 = 0,
w01 = 0,
w11 = y1,
w02 = 0,
w12 = y1,
w22 = y2,
p00 = e
−φ1e−φ2
p01 = φ1e
−φ1e−φ2
p11 = (1− e
−φ1 − φ1e
−φ1)e−φ2
p02 = φ2e
−φ2e−φ1
p12 = φ2e
−φ2(1− e−φ1)
p22 = (1− e
−φ2 − φ2e
−φ2)


(2.3)
where pji denotes the probability that worker obtains a wage w
j
i .
If the numbers of vacancies are given exogenously (i.e., if φ1and φ2 were
parameters) then (2.3) would represent the ﬁnal solution of the model. Ex-
amining (2.3), it is clear that wage dispersion has two sources: contract
dispersion and productivity dispersion. For example, the diﬀerence in the
wages w11 = y1 and w
0
1 = 0 is due entirely to contract dispersion: in both
cases, the productivity of the job is low, but workers who earn w11 had a
second-best oﬀer from another low productivity job whereas workers who
earn w01 did not. In order to receive the highest wage w
2
2 = y2, workers
need to be on the right end of both contract and productivity dispersion:
the presence of at least one high productivity vacancy is required to make
this wage technically feasible, and the presence of at least one other high
productivity vacancy, as a second-best oﬀer is required to make this wage an
equilibrium outcome. It is also clear that contract dispersion can be at least
as important to workers as productivity dispersion. For example, a worker
in a high productivity job earns a wage equal to w02 = 0 with probability p
0
2
while a worker in low productivity job earns a higher wage w11 = y1 of with
probability p11. Both of these probabilities are positive if φ1, φ2 > 0. We
now turn to the determination of φ1 and φ2.
2.3 Vacancy Entry
We now consider the ﬁrst stage of the game, where ﬁrms decide how many
vacancies, of each type, to create. We assume that each ﬁrm can create one
vacancy. (Thus, we use the terms “ﬁrm” and “vacancy” interchangeably —
depending on the context.) The proﬁt of a ﬁrm is equal to its output minus
its vacancy creation cost and the wage it pays to the worker. Therefore, the
proﬁt πji of a vacant job of productivity yi that makes an oﬀer to a worker
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who has a best rival oﬀer of productivity yj is given by:
πji = max{yi − yj, 0} − ki (2.4)
Let qji be the probability that a ﬁrm earns a proﬁt equal to π
j
i . Thus, the
expected proﬁt πi of a vacant job of productivity yi is given by:
π1 = max{q
0
1y1 − k1, 0} (2.5)
π2 = max{q
0
2y2 + q
1
2(y2 − y1)− k2, 0} (2.6)
The probability that a vacant job does not face competition from a rival
job of productivity yi is given by e
−φi . Therefore q01 = q
0
2 = e
−φ1e−φ2 is
the probability that the vacant job does not face a rival vacant job of either
productivity, and q12 = (1 − e
−φ1)e−φ2 is the probability that a vacant job
faces a low productivity rival but not a high productivity rival.
The supply of vacant jobs of productivity yi is determined by free entry,
so the expected proﬁt πi of a vacant job of productivity yi is equal to zero
in equilibrium:
π1 = π2 = 0 (2.7)
The assumption that the output of a particular type of job is greater than
the cost of the job vacancy does not guarantee that the supply of jobs of
that type is positive. (For example, it is easy to see that q01y1 − k1 can be
negative if φ2 is suﬃciently large - making q
0
1 suﬃciently small.) Therefore
we do not know, based on our present assumptions, whether or not the two
diﬀerent jobs will exist in equilibrium. The following proposition presents a
necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of this type of technology
dispersion.
Proposition 1 For given values of (y1, y2, k1, k2) a unique equilibrium ex-
ists with a strictly positive number of both types of jobs if and only if the
following condition holds:
0 <
k2
y2
−
k1
y1
<
y2 − y1
y2
Proof. In any equilibrium with both types of vacancies, the expected
proﬁt for each type of vacancy is given by
π1 = e
−φ1e−φ2y1 − k1 = 0 by equations (2.5) and (2.7)
and
π2 = e
−φ1e−φ2y2+(1−e
−φ1)e−φ2(y2−y1)−k2 = 0 by equations (2.6) and (2.7)
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Solving these simultaneously yields the unique solution:
φ1 = ln(y1/k1)− ln((y2 − y1)/(k2 − k1)) (2.8)
and
φ2 = ln((y2 − y1)/(k2 − k1)) (2.9)
It follows that φ1, φ2 > 0 iﬀ y2 − k2 > y1 − k1 and k1/y1 < k2/y2, which
imply the condition above.
The left side of this condition implies that marginal costs (relative to
productivity) are increasing. This ensures the existence of some bad jobs in
equilibrium. The right hand side of the condition states that the percentage
productivity advantage from a good job is larger than the increment in
marginal costs incurred from producing a good job. This ensures that the
supply of high productivity jobs is positive.
2.4 Properties of the Equilibrium
When the condition of Proposition 1 holds, then equations (2.3), (2.7), (2.8),
and (2.9) completely solve for the equilibrium payoﬀ structure in the static
model. Also, the value of the unemployment rate in this equilibrium (p0 =
e−φ1e−φ2) can be found from equations (2.5) and (2.7):
p0 =
k1
y1
This simple expression makes it clear that, in the equilibrium where both
types of jobs exist, it is the marginal cost (relative to productivity) of bad
jobs that determines unemployment. Good jobs produce more, but are
costly to create. Once the number of good jobs is determined, through
(2.9), then bad jobs (which are relatively cheap to create) ﬁll in to the point
were no further job creation is warranted in equilibrium.6
Although we do not prove it here, it is easy to show that the allocation in
this equilibrium is constrained-eﬃcient in the sense that a planner who can
choose entry, but faces the same coordination friction, would choose precisely
the same allocation.7 The matching rate for good jobs in this allocation is
(1 − e−φ2), which is diﬀerent from the rate for bad jobs: e−φ2(1 − e−φ1).
This accords with the results found by Davis (2001) although, here, these
matching rates are obtained in equilibrium. Notice, also, the aggregate
matching function N(1− e−(φ1+φ2)) has constant returns to scale.
6 In the absence of job heterogeneity, the unemployment rate becomes simply p0 = k/y.
7See Julien, Kennes, and King (2001b) for eﬃciency proofs for both the static and
dynamic models.
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Given the existence of both good and bad jobs in equilibrium, with higher
wages, on average, for good jobs, it is natural to allow for on-the-job search
in dynamic versions of the model.
3 The Dynamic Model with On-the-Job Search
There is large number, N , of identical risk neutral workers facing an inﬁnite
horizon, perfect capital markets, and a common discount factor β. In each
time period, each worker has one indivisible unit of labor to sell. Since we
focus on stationary equilibria, we drop the time subscript and, whenever
needed, we use an prime (’) to refer to period t+1, two primes for t+2, and
so on. At the start of each period there exist Ei workers in jobs of producing
yi > 0 where i ∈ {1, 2}., y2 > y1, and (N − E1 − E2) unemployed workers,
with production y0 = 0. Also, at the beginning of each period, there exist
Mi = φi(N − E1 − E2) vacant jobs of each productivity type directed at
unemployed workers and M̂2 = φ̂2E1 high productivity vacant jobs directed
at employed workers in jobs of productivity y1.
8 In each period a vacant
job has a capital cost of ki where k2 > k1. Any match in any period may
dissolve in at the beginning of the subsequent period with ﬁxed probability
ρ ∈ (0, 1). In each period, any vacancy can enter negotiations with at most
one worker.
Within each period, the order of play is as follows. At the beginning of
the period, given the state, new vacancies enter. Next, unemployed workers
and workers who are employed in low quality jobs send applications, stating
their actual state of employment, to all vacancies costlessly.9 Once the num-
ber of entrants has been established, and job applications received, vacancies
choose which workers to approach. Once new vacancies have been assigned
to candidates, wage contracts are determined through the auction mecha-
nism. After this, production occurs and each agent receives the amount
agreed to in the contract. At the end of the period, a fraction ρ of existing
matches dissolves.
3.1 Wage Contract Determination
Let Λi denote the total expected discounted value of a match between a
worker and a job of productivity yi at the start of any period, with Λ0 rep-
resenting the reserve value associated with an unemployed worker. Through
8Note that no low productivity vacant jobs are directed at employed workers in high
productivity jobs. As should be clear, this would never be proﬁtable since this would entail
two high productivity jobs competing for the same worker, with Bertrand competition
driving the wage up to y2.
9We assume here that veriﬁcation of employment status is easy for employers to do,
and is part of the cost of vacancy creation.
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the auction, in a way entirely analogous to the static model, the value of a
worker’s wage contractW ji is equal to the expected discounted value Λj of a
match between the worker and the worker’s second best available job oﬀer:
W ji = Λj (3.1)
The per period wage is assumed to be constant over the employment
duration.
3.2 Frictional Assignment of Vacancies to Workers
Unemployed workers have a reserve value of Λ0 while workers in low pro-
ductivity jobs have a reserve value of Λ1. The workers are distinguishable
only by their employment state. As in the static model, we restrict attention
to the unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which each vacancy
randomises over each relevant group of workers. Consequently, the new hires
of H2 high productivity workers and H1 low productivity workers are given
respectively by:
H2 = (N −E1 −E2)p2 +E1p̂2 (3.2)
H1 = (N −E1 −E2)p1 −E1p̂2 (3.3)
where p2 = (1 − e
−φ2), p1 = (1 − e
−φ1)e−φ2 and p̂2 = (1 − e
−φ̂2). The
term E1p̂2 in these equations represents the “raiding” of workers from low
productivity jobs into high productivity ones.
The fraction ρ of all jobs dissolve at the end of the period, therefore,
the supply of candidates of each type evolves according to the following
transition equations:
E
′
i = (1− ρ)(Ei +Hi) i ∈ {1, 2} (3.4)
3.3 The Value of Unmatched and Matched Workers
The randomness of job oﬀers implies that the expected value of being a can-
didate in every period is determined by the expected wage contract one can
obtain depending on whether no, only one, or multiple oﬀers from vacancies
of either type are received. The expected present value of a worker without
a job at the start of a period is:
V = p00W
0
0 + p
0
1W
0
1 + p
0
2W
0
2 + p
1
1W
1
1 + p
1
2W
1
2 + p
2
2W
2
2
From the auction equation (3.1), W 00 = W
0
1 = W
0
2 = Λ0, W
1
1 = W
1
2 = Λ1
and W 22 = Λ2, therefore
V = (p00 + p
0
1 + p
0
2)Λ0 + (p
1
1 + p
1
2)Λ1 + p
2
2Λ2 (3.5)
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where p00+ p
0
1+ p
0
2 = (1+ φ1+ φ2)e
−φ1e−φ2 is the probability that a worker
has one or fewer oﬀers, p11+p
1
2 = e
−φ2(1−φ1e
−φ1−e−φ1)+φ2e
−φ2(1−e−φ1)
is the probability of multiple oﬀers only one of which is possibly good, and
p22 = 1− e
−φ2 − φ2e
−φ2 is the probability of multiple good oﬀers.
The value of being an unemployed worker in the next period determines
the value of a unmatched worker at the end of a period:
Λ0 = βV
′
. (3.6)
where Λ0 also gives the outside option of all workers in any wage negotiations
with a single ﬁrm.
The total surplus of a high productivity job is equal to the output of a
high productivity job plus the discounted future ﬂow of income from such a
job weighted by the probability of an exogenous job separation into unem-
ployment:
Λ2 = y2 + β[ρV
′
+ (1− ρ)y2]
+β2(1− ρ)[ρV ” + (1− ρ)y2] + ... (3.7)
Wages in low productivity jobs are determined with the understanding
that the worker will get the increase of surplus associated with any potential
favourable future bargain between the worker and a high productivity job
during the worker’s tenure at a low productivity job. Therefore, the expected
present value of being a worker in a low productivity job must incorporate
the probability of moving into a higher paying (high productivity) job in a
subsequent period. Hence
Λ1 = y1 + β[ρV
′
+ (1− ρ)X
′
]
+β2(1− ρ)[ρV ” + (1− ρ)X”] + ... (3.8)
where X
′
= (p̂11y1+ p̂
1
2Λ1t+ p̂
2
2Λ2t) is the present value of being a candidate
in the market while employed in a low productivity job and allows for three
possible outcomes: p̂11 = e
−φ̂2 (the probability that the employed worker is
not recruited), p̂12 = φ̂2e
−φ̂2 (the probability that the employed worker is
recruited by one good job), and p̂22 = 1−e
−φ̂2− φ̂2e
−φ̂2 (the probability that
the worker is recruited by one or more high productivity jobs).
In the stationary equilibrium:
Λ0 = βV (3.9)
Λ1 =
y1 + β(ρV + (1− ρ)(1− φ̂2e
−φ̂2 − e−φ̂2)Λ2)
1− β(1− ρ)(φ̂2e
−φ̂2 + e−φ̂2)
(3.10)
Λ2 =
y2 + βρV
(1− β(1− ρ))
(3.11)
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The equilibrium values of Λ0 and Λ2 , in (3.9) and (3.11), are standard
present values. The equilibrium value Λ1 in (3.10), however, deserves some
comment. The term (φ̂2e
−φ̂2 + e−φ̂2) is the probability with which a candi-
date doing on-the-job search is not raided by a better paying job. Therefore
β(1−ρ)(φ̂2e
−φ̂2 +e−φ̂2) is the adjusted discount factor for such a candidate,
accounting for the exogenous probability (1− ρ) of not being separated and
the endogenous probability of not being separated by a better paying job.
The equilibrium value Λ1 is the present discounted value of being paid y1
plus the discounted next period gamble of being exogenously separated and
becoming an unemployed candidate (ρV ), and of being only endogenously
separated by a better paying job oﬀer (1− ρ)(1− φ̂2e
−φ̂2 − e−φ̂2)Λ2.
In the stationary equilibrium, the expected present value of being a can-
didate on the market for an unemployed worker can be expressed as:
V = Λ2 − (Λ1 − Λ0) (1 + φ1 + φ2) e
−φ1e−φ2 − (Λ2 − Λ1) (1 + φ2) e
−φ2
Using equations (3.9), (3.10), (3.11) and above yields:
V =
1
(1− β)
(
y2 − (1− β(1− ρ))
[
(1 + φ1 + φ2)k1 +
e−φ2
e−φˆ2
(1 + φ2)k2
])
(3.12)
This is the expected present value of being a candidate on the mar-
ket for an unemployed worker, expressed as a function of the parameters
(β, ρ, y2, k1, k2) and the vacancy ratios φ1, φ2 and φˆ2 . Although y1 does not
appear explicitly in this expression, we show, below, that the ratios φ1, φ2
and φˆ2 are implicit functions of the parameters, including y1.We now turn
attention to the determination of these ratios.
3.4 Equilibrium Vacancies
The expected proﬁt Πi of a job of productivity yi making an oﬀer to an
unemployed worker satisﬁes:
Π1 = max{(Λ1 − Λ0)e
−φ1e−φ2 − k1, 0} (3.13)
Π2 = max{(Λ2 − Λ0)e
−φ1e−φ2
+(Λ2 − Λ1)(1− e
−φ1)e−φ2 − k2, 0} (3.14)
where e−φ1e−φ2 is the probability that a low or high productivity job does
not face a rival, and (1−e−φ1)e−φ2 is the probability that a high productivity
job faces only a low productivity rival.
The expected proﬁt of an oﬀer by a high productivity to a worker in a
low productivity job is given by:
Π̂2 = max{(Λ2 − Λ1)e
−φ̂2 − k2, 0} (3.15)
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where e−φ̂2 is the probability that high productivity job does not face a
competing oﬀer from a rival high productivity job. The supply of vacant
jobs of productivity yi is determined by free entry. Thus:
Π1 = Π2 = Π̂2 = 0 (3.16)
The free entry conditions imply that
Λ1 − Λ0 =
k1
e−φ1e−φ2
(3.17)
(Λ2 − Λ0)e
−φ1e−φ2 + (Λ2 − Λ1)(1− e
−φ1)e−φ2 = k2 (3.18)
Λ2 − Λ1 =
k2
e−φˆ2
(3.19)
which imply that Λ2 > Λ1 > Λ0 for all φ.
The stationary equilibrium values of the endogenous variables V , Λ0, Λ1,
Λ2, φ1, φ2, and φ̂2 are determined by equations (3.9)-(3.12) and (3.17)-(3.19).
The following proposition summarizes key properties of the stationary equi-
librium.
Proposition 2 For given values of (β, ρ, y1, y2, k1, k2), a unique Stationary
Equilibrium exists where
a) All types of vacancies are created:
〈
φ1, φ2, φ̂2
〉
>> 0 iﬀ
k1 <
(
y1 + β (1− ρ) k2
(
φ2 − φ̂2
))
e−φ2 and k2 <
y2 − y1
1− β(1− ρ)
b) Only vacancies targeted at unemployed workers are created:
〈φ1, φ2〉 >> 0 and φ̂2 = 0 iﬀ
k1 <
(
y1 + β (1− ρ) k2
(
φ2 − φ̂2
))
e−φ2 and
y2 − y1
1− β(1− ρ)
≤ k2 <
y2 − y1 + k1
1− β(1− ρ)
(
1 + ln
(
k2−k1
k2
))
c) Only high productivity vacancies targeted at unemployed workers are
created:
〈
φ1, φ̂2
〉
= 0 and φ2 > 0 iﬀ
k1 ≥
(
y1 + β (1− ρ) k2
(
φ2 − φ̂2
))
e−φ2 and
y2 − y1
1− β(1− ρ)
≤ k2 <
y2 − y1 + k1
1− β(1− ρ)
(
1 + ln
(
k2−k1
k2
))
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d) Only low productivity vacancies are created:
〈
φ2, φ̂2
〉
= 0 and
φ1 > 0 iﬀ
k1 <
(
y1 + β (1− ρ) k2
(
φ2 − φ̂2
))
e−φ2 and
k2 >
y2 − y1 + k1
1− β(1− ρ)
(
1 + ln
(
k2−k1
k2
))
This proposition places bounds on the costs of vacancy creation, relative
to productivity diﬀerentials, for ﬁrms to have incentives to create proﬁtable
vacancies. For all types of vacancies to be created in equilibrium (part (a)),
for example, there are only upper bounds on k1 and k2. For equilibria with
both high and low productivity vacancies, but no on-the-job-search (part
(b)) there are both upper and lower bounds on k2. In this equilibrium,
k2 is low enough to induce the creation of high productivity jobs aimed at
unemployed workers, but too high for the creation of of these jobs aimed
at employed workers. Notice that, in this equilibrium, low productivity
jobs are created and there is no on-the-job search — so there is no threat of
losing workers to higher paying jobs, once hired. We should expect, then,
that more low productivity jobs would be created in this environment. This
basic intuition is veriﬁed in the numerical analysis below. Parts (c) and (d)
of the Proposition identify conditions under which only one type of job will
be created in equilibrium (high and low productivity jobs respectively).
In this paper we focus on the equilibrium, identiﬁed in part (a) of Propo-
sition 2, where all three types of vacancies are created. The following corol-
lary identiﬁes an important feature of this equilibrium.
Corollary 1 In the equilibrium where all types of vacancies are created,
the job arrival rate for unemployed workers is greater than for on-the-job
searchers: (1− e−(φ1+φ2)) > (1− e−φ̂2) > 0.
This corollary underscores the endogeneity of the matching process in
the model. By way of contrast, models with on-the-job search and purely
random matching use parametric rates for both unemployed workers and on-
the-job searchers (typically denoted λ0 and λ1 respectively).
10 In line with
empirical work on these rates, (Kiefer and Neumann (1993)) these models
usually impose the condition that λ0 > λ1. Corollary 1 shows that this is
justiﬁable as an equilibrium phenomenon, and how this relates to labor mar-
ket tightness conditions and, ultimately, the parameters (β, ρ, y1, y2, k1, k2).
10For example, Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
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3.4.1 Steady State Employment and Unemployment
The transition equations for the ﬂow of workers between diﬀerent employ-
ment states can be used to derive the steady state end-of-period employment
levels. In a stationary equilibrium, the fraction of workers in each produc-
tivity state (after the matching has taken place) is given by:
n0 =
ρe−φ1e−φ2
1− (1− ρ)e−φ1e−φ2
(3.20)
n1 =
(1− (1− n0)(1− ρ))e
−φ2(1− e−φ1)
ρ+ (1− ρ)(1− e−φ̂2)
(3.21)
n2 = 1− n1 − n0 (3.22)
where ni = (Ei +Hi)/N , i = 1, 2.
3.4.2 The Wage Distribution
In order to obtain a wage distribution, the periodic wages in the station-
ary distribution must be obtained. As mentioned above, we assume here
that wage contracts specify constant wages over the expected length of the
contract. Using equation (3.1), these wages are determined by:
w00 = 0 (3.23)
wj2 + βρV
1− β(1− ρ)
= W j2 = Λj ∀ j ∈ {0, 1, 2} (3.24)
w
j
1+β(ρV+(1−ρ)(1−φ̂2e
−φ̂2−e−φ̂2 )Λ2)
1−β(1−ρ)(φ̂2e
−φ̂2+e−φ̂2)
= W j1 = Λj ∀ j ∈ {0, 1} (3.25)
where wji denotes the wage per period of a worker under wage contract W
j
i .
Thus, the wage distribution Ωd of the dynamic model with on-the-job search
is given by:
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Ωd ≡
[
wji , n
j
i
]
=


w00 = 0,
w01 = Λ0 − β(ρV
+(1− ρ)(Λ2(1− (1 + φ̂2)e
−φ̂2) + Λ0(1 + φ̂2)e
−φ̂2))
w11 = y1
w02 = Λ0 − β(ρV + (1− ρ)Λ0)
w12 = Λ1 − β(ρV + (1− ρ)Λ1)
w22 = y2
n00 = n0
n01 =
(
[ρ+ (1− ρ)n0]φ1e
−φ1
)
/
(
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
1− e−φ̂2
))
n11 = n1 − n
0
1
n02 = (1 + n0(1− ρ)/ρ)φ2e
−φ1e−φ2
n12 = (1 + n0(1− ρ)/ρ)
(
1− e−φ1
)
φ2e
−φ2
+ n1φ̂2e
−φ̂2(1− ρ)/ρ
n22 = n2 − n
0
2 − n
1
2


.
(3.26)
Since the values of the endogenous variables (V,Λ0,Λ1,Λ2, φ1, φ2, φ̂2)
are determined by equations (3.9)-(3.12), (3.17)-(3.19) and the parameters
(β, ρ, y1, y2, k1, k2), equation (3.26) completely determines the wage struc-
ture in the stationary equilibrium. At this point, it is useful to compare this
structure with that of the static model (given in equation (2.3)). Clearly,
w00, w
1
1, and w
2
2 are the same in the two models. The reasoning why w
0
0 = 0,
w11 = y1 and w
2
2 = y2 is straightforward in both models, but w
0
1, w
0
2 and w
1
2
may need some explanation.
The wage w01 is paid to a worker who had no other oﬀers when matched
with one low productivity vacancy. It is equal to the present value of the
immediate outside option Λ0 at the time of the wage negotiation minus the
discounted future outside option while the worker is employed. The future
outside option reﬂects the following gamble. With the exogenous probability
ρ the worker will become unemployed and receive the market value of being
in the labor force. With the probability (1 − ρ) the worker will not lose
his job, in which case the worker faces another gamble determined by the
endogenous probability (1− (1 + φ̂2)e
−φ̂2) of ﬁnding a better job, receiving
Λ2, and the probability of not getting a better wage oﬀer and remaining
with the same wage under Λ0.
Wages w02 and w
1
2 are similar, but with the wage reﬂecting matches with
a lone high productivity vacancy, and a high productivity vacancy where the
second best oﬀer was from a low productivity vacancy respectively. In both
cases, the wage reﬂects the immediate outside option and the discounted
future outside option while employed — which is a gamble determined by
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the exogenous probability ρ alone, since no vacancies raid workers currently
employed in high productivity jobs.
3.4.3 Eﬃciency
As mentioned above, although we do not prove it here, the equilibrium of
this model is constrained eﬃcient. The eﬃciency of the equilibrium with
on-the-job search demonstrates that commitment to a match between a low
productivity job and a worker is not a desired property for social welfare and
that the wage proﬁles of our decentralized model solve this problem of non-
commitment eﬃciently, given the coordination problem. This result resolves
a problem of ineﬃciency posed by Pissarides (1994, 2000) and Kennes (1994)
concerning the optimal wage proﬁles of models with matching technologies
and on-the-job search. The answer to the problem is simply that workers
in bad jobs are paid lower wages in equilibrium to compensate for the later
wage improvement associated with the movement of these employed workers
into good jobs through the process of on-the-job search.
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we try to assess the quantitative signiﬁcance of the model
through numerical simulations. We think of this as a model of the nat-
ural rate of unemployment — where there is no cyclical component in the
unemployment rate. Ideally, then, we would like to choose values of the
parameters to match values of key endogenous variables with empirical data
for an economy operating at its natural rate. One of the key endogenous
variables in this model is residual wage dispersion, that is, wage dispersion
among homogeneous workers. Data on this dispersion is hard to come by
but, fortunately, Katz and Autor (1999) do provide statistics for the US
economy — most recently in 1995. We therefore use data for the US, from
a variety of sources, to pin down values of some of the parameters, in an
idealized natural rate setting.
4.1 Baseline Parameter Values
The model has six parameters: (β, ρ, y1, y2, k1, k2). The Katz and Autor
(1999) study analyses weekly data. With an annual discount rate of 5%,
this implies a weekly discount factor of β = 0.999. We chose a weekly value
of ρ = 0.0089, which corresponds to a monthly value of 3.5%, used by Hall
(2004). (This is also the annual average of the total nonfarm separation rate
recorded in 2001, the ﬁrst annual data point available in the Job Openings
and Labor Turnover Survey at the BLS.)11 To focus on an equilibrium with
11As mentioned above, Cao and Shi (2000) consider numerical simulations of their di-
rected search model with wage posting. While they do not calibrate their model to match
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Statistic Model US Data
Mean Wage 254.88 255
Unemployment Rate 4.08 4.0
Vacancy Rate 1.47 1.5
Standard Deviation Log Wage 0.3100 0.603
90% — 10% Log Wage (Residual) 1.0344 1.15
Table 1: Comparing Statistics
on-the-job search, given the values of β and ρ, we restricted our choices of
(y1, y2, k1, k2) and to satisfy the condition stated in Proposition 2, part (a).
We set y1 = 150, which is at the lower end of the observed distribution,
and chose the values of y2, k1 and k2 to match the average weekly wage for
males in 1982 dollars ($255), the “natural” rate of unemployment (4%) and
the vacancy rate of 1.5% .12 These values were y2 = 1037, k1 = 1450 and
k2 = 75399.
The values of k1 and k2 may seem quite high, when considering weekly
costs. However, in the model, these costs terminate once a vacancy is ﬁlled
— and vacancies are ﬁlled quite quickly in equilibrium. In reality, there are
ﬁxed costs when creating jobs, and these can be quite large when considering
that capital is used to match with a worker. Following Pissarides (2000),
to keep the state vector as small as possible, we model these costs as ﬂow
costs. As a consequence, to balance the expected present value of the inﬁnite
stream of beneﬁts from a job, the costs (which are expected to persist for a
small number of periods) appear large. Note, however, that they are small
relative to the equilibrium values of the matches Λ1 and Λ2 presented in
equation (4.2) below.
4.2 Results
Table 1 compares some of the statistics from this example with those from
US data.
The values of the parameters were chosen so that the mean wage, the
unemployment rate, and the vacancy rate were close to those in the data.
Katz and Autor report that the standard deviation of the overall log wage
in the US overall in 1995 was 0.603. In the model, the corresponding ﬁgure
is 0.3083. - approximately 51% of the ﬁgure in the data. This is 75% of the
2/3 ﬁgure they attribute to residual wage dispersion.
any moments in the data, they do choose the monthly separation rate to be 3%.
12The actual unemployment rate in 1995 was 5.6%. We chose 4% as our target because
because the unemployment rate settled down to that number in 2000 — arguably, this was
the natural rate. The 1.5% ﬁgure for the vacancy rate used registered vacancies from the
OECD Main Economic Indicators.
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The result is closer for another statistic reported by Katz and Autor.
They report the diﬀerences of the 90th and 10th percentiles of the log wage
distribution, for the residual wage distribution: 1.15. In the model, this
ﬁgure is 1.0344 — approximately 90% of Katz and Autor’s number.
4.2.1 The Equilibrium Wage Distribution
The following matrix, corresponding to equation (3.26), presents the equilib-
rium weekly wage distribution, Ω˜d, in 1982 dollars, for this set of parameters.
Ω˜d =


w00 = 0
w01 = 129.47
w11 = 150
w02 = 233.45
w12 = 251.63
w22 = 1037
n00 = 0.0322
n01 = 0.0974
n11 = 0.0013
n02 = 0.2576
n12 = 0.5862
n22 = 0.0253


(4.1)
From (4.1), it is quite clear that both productivity dispersion and con-
tract dispersion play important roles in wage determination in the model.
For example, among workers that receive only one job oﬀer, those that re-
ceive this oﬀer from a high productivity vacancy receive a wage of w02 =
233.45, while those that receive the oﬀer from a low productivity vacancy
receive only w01 = 129.47. This diﬀerence is due entirely to productiv-
ity dispersion. However, among those workers that take jobs with high
productivity vacancies, those that had no other oﬀer receive w02 = 233.45,
those whose second-best oﬀer came from a low-productivity vacancy receive
w12 = 251.63, while those whose second-best oﬀer came from another high
productivity vacancy receive w22 = 1037. The diﬀerence of these three wages
is driven purely by contract dispersion.
Equation (4.1) also shows that, in the stationary equilibrium, most work-
ers are in good jobs. Adding n01 and n
1
1, we can see that only 9.87% of workers
are in bad jobs. Altogether, 86.91% of workers are in good jobs. However,
very few (2.52%) are paid the top wage of w22 = 1037. Due to contract
dispersion, 25.76% earn only w02 = 233.45, while 58.62% earn w
1
2 = 251.63.
This leaves 4% unemployed. As in empirical studies, this distribution is
hump-shaped, and signiﬁcantly skewed to the right, with a small fraction of
people earning high wages. Figure 1 provides a plot of this distribution.
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Figure 1: The Equilibrium Wage Distribution
4.2.2 Quantity and Value of Jobs
The following matrix shows the calibrated stationary equilibrium values of
the tightness variables for the diﬀerent jobs, and the present values of the
surplus associated with each type of match.
[
φ˜, Λ˜
]
=

 φ̂2 = 0.0517φ2 = 0.0711
φ1 = 0.1658
Λ0 = 235, 548
Λ1 = 237, 385
Λ2 = 316, 787

 (4.2)
Although the vacancy/unemployment ratio for bad jobs is more than
twice that for good jobs, as mentioned above, the vast majority of workers
are in good jobs in the stationary equilibrium. On-the-job-search is signif-
icant enough to drive this result. Workers in bad jobs know that they will
not stay there for very long. The following table represents the one-week
transition matrix for wages in the stationary equilibrium.13
w00 w
0
1 w
1
1 w
0
2 w
1
2 w
2
2
w00 .7891 .1308 .0115 .0561 .0101 .0024
w01 .0070 .9424 .0001 .0005 .0487 .0013
w11 .0070 .0012 .9413 .0005 .0487 .0013
w02 .0070 .0012 .0001 .9916 .0001 .0000
w12 .0070 .0012 .0001 .0005 .9912 .0000
w22 .0070 .0012 .0001 .0005 .0001 .9911
13We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the inclusion of this
table. The values 0.0000 are not to be taken literally as 0. They are both approximately
0.0000214.
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Workers in bad jobs, earning, for example, w01 = 129.47, know that the
probability of getting a higher paid job in the near future is quite high:
with a 5.06%, chance (.0001+ .0005+ .0487+ .0013), they will get one next
week. The liklihood of getting one within a month is 18.75%. Within a
year, this will happen with a 93.28% probability. There are two routes to
higher paid jobs for someone earning w01. First, they may be separated from
their current bad job, and earn more through successful oﬀ-the-job search
(over the period of a week, this occurs with probability 0.07%). Second,
they may be successful with on-the-job search. Over a week, this occurs
with the signiﬁcantly higher probability of 4.99%. Thus, on-the-job search
plays a major role in determining the shape of the wage distribution, by
moving most workers into good jobs eventually, with a peak density at w12.
This particular feature is shared with the model in Burdett and Mortensen
(1998). However, the fact that there exists a higher wage, beyond the peak
density, comes from the existence of contract dispersion in the model —
wages diﬀer among workers in good jobs because some workers have more
good jobs approach them than others. This feature is not present in Burdett
and Mortensen (1998), but is shared with Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)
who, as here, allow for counteroﬀers and ex post wage adjustment. Also key
to keeping the density smaller at the highest wage is the fact that job arrival
rates are smaller for on-the-job searchers than for unemployed workers. In
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), this diﬀerence in the arrival rates is assumed.
Here, it is a result that emerges in equilibrium. 14
4.2.3 Endogenous Arrival Rates and Equilibrium Turnover
From equation (4.2), it can be seen that the probability of a worker receiving
a good job oﬀer, when unemployed (1 − e−φ2 = 0.069) is higher than the
receiving one when already employed in a bad job ( 1−e−φ̂2= 0.0504). This
occurs because of the more signiﬁcant outside option that a worker in a bad
job has: if successfully recruited, due to the auction mechanism, he must be
paid w12 = 251.63, rather the wage w
0
2 = 233.45 paid to a worker that was
previously unemployed.
Overall, the arrival rate of job oﬀers for workers currently employed
(0.0504) is approximately one quarter the arrival rate for unemployed work-
ers (1 − e−φ1e−φ2 = 0.2109). The ratio of these rates broadly consistent
with empirical estimates made by Kiefer and Neumann (1993), and the
parametric rates used in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), although the rates
14This process has the implication that the ratio Λ2/Λ1 = 1.33 is signiﬁcantly smaller
than the value of y2/y1 = 6.91. The values of the matches include all expected returns to
both the ﬁrm and the worker. Thus, the value of Λ1 takes into account the fact that the
worker will, most likely, move on to a good job in the future.
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themselves are considerably higher. A related statistic, the aggregate equi-
librium monthly job ﬁnding rate (deﬁned as the number of matches divided
by the number of unemployed) in this model is 0.599. As one might expect,
this is above empirical estimates. Shimer (2004), for example estimates the
average job ﬁnding rate in the US from 1951 to 2003 to be 0.343.
The model predicts that the average spell of unemployment will last
approximately 4.7 weeks. The actual length in 1995 (from the BLS) was
approximately 16.6 in 1995. However, as noted above, the unemployment
rate in 1995 was 5.6%, not the natural rate of 4% that we use here. In
the year 2000, when the unemployment rate was 4%, the average spell of
unemployment lasted 12.6 weeks.
Of course, the aggregate data from the BLS does not control for hetero-
geneity and there are good reasons to expect that heterogeneity in the labor
market increases the length of unemployment spells.15 It seems reasonable
to say, though, that this model underpredicts unemployment durations, and
overpredicts job ﬁnding rates. In general, the equilibrium matching pro-
cess in this model appears to be more eﬀective than is evidenced in the US
economy.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
We experimented by considering ranges of values for all of the parameters,
around the baseline. The results are summarized in the following tables.
4.3.1 Changes in the discount factor β
β .9986 .9988 .9990 .9992 .9994 .9996 .9998
φ1 .1948 .1801 .1658 .1515 .1374 .1232 .1089
φ2 .0642 .0678 .0711 .0744 .0775 .0804 .0833
φ̂2 .0447 .0483 .0517 .0550 .0581 .0610 .0639
W 227.60 241.13 254.88 268.84 283.02 297.43 312.06
U 3.79 3.93 4.08 4.25 4.44 4.65 4.89
V 1.51 1.49 1.47 1.45 1.42 1.39 1.36
σlogw .2972 .3045 .3100 .3140 .3164 .3173* .3165
90-10 .8972 .9681 1.0344 1.0859 1.1339 1.1794 1.2224
This table shows how the values of key endogenous variables change as
the discount factor β ranges from 0.9986 to 0.9998. The ﬁrst thing to notice
15Speciﬁcally, when workers are heterogeneous, in the the mixed strategy equilibrium,
ﬁrms place higher visit probabilities on more productive workers. With the appropriate
wage determination mechanism (such as the auction we use here) this leads to a con-
strained eﬃcient outcome, but raises the unemployment rate. See, for example, Julien,
Kennes, and King (2005).
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in this table is that the entry of good jobs, both for unemployed workers
(φ2) and employed (φ̂2), increases with β. However, the entry of bad jobs
(φ1) decreases. Thus, changes in β aﬀects the mix of jobs in equilibrium.
Increases in β increase the expected present value of the stream of future
payoﬀs, relative to the vacancy costs that must be paid up front. This af-
fects good jobs disproportionately, because their up front costs are higher
than for bad jobs. With more good jobs created in equilibrium, this makes
it less proﬁtable to create bad jobs. The mean wage (W ), which is inﬂu-
enced mainly by the number of good jobs, is therefore increasing in β and
is quite responsive to changes in its value: a 0.12% increase in the discount
factor induces a 37.1% increase in the mean wage. The unemployment rate
(U), which is mainly sensitive to the number of bad jobs in equilibrium, is
increasing in β as the number of bad jobs falls, and rises by more than a
percentage point over the range. The vacancy rate (V ), which is also mainly
sensitive to the number of bad jobs, is decreasing in β as the number of bad
jobs falls. Thus, changes in the discount factor cause unemployment and
vacancies to move in opposite directions.
The two diﬀerent measures of wage dispersion, σlogw and log 90− log 10,
are aﬀected diﬀerently by changes in β. The log 90−log 10 statistic is strictly
increasing in β for the range considered, as more good jobs are created, and
less bad ones, but σlogw is non-monotonic in β — initally rising, then falling.
In the table, the σlogw statistic reaches a maximum at 0.3173, indicated
by the asterisk, where β = 0.9996. However, locally, at the point of the
baseline, both measures of inequality rise with β.
4.3.2 Changes in the separation rate ρ
ρ .0076 .0081 .0085 .0093 .0097 .0101 .0105
φ1 .0701 .1084 .1371 .1951 .2262 .2608 .3039
φ2 .0902 .0834 .0775 .0641 .0561 .0466 .0340
φ̂2 .0708 .0640 .0581 .0447 .0367 .0272 .0146
W 352.28 313.63 283.94 226.86 199.91 174.28 150.22
U 4.89 4.47 4.25 3.95 3.83 3.71 3.57
V 1.07 1.24 1.36 1.58 1.67 1.74* 1.73
σlogw .2950 .3110 .3122* .2986 .2777 .2427 .1806
90-10 1.3100 1.2180 1.1224 .8944 .7333 .5463 .3296
This table shows how the values of key endogenous variables change as
the separation rate ρ ranges from .0076 to .0105. Intuitively, the eﬀect on
entry of the separation rate is the opposite of that of the discount factor.
Increases in ρ reduce the expected present value of income streams. Thus, for
the reasons outlined above, φ2 and φ̂2 are decreasing, and φ1 is increasing,
in ρ. For analogous reasons, the mean wage is decreasing, and is quite
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sensitive to, changes in ρ: a 38% increase in ρ induces a 57% decrease inW .
The unemployment rate is aﬀected by changes in ρ through two channels
— one direct and one indirect — working in opposite directions. Directly
the separation rate increases the unemployment rate, for obvious reasons.
However, indirectly, the unemployment rate is sensitive to the number of
bad jobs in equilibrium, which is driven up by an increase in ρ. That is,
indirectly, through bad job creation, an increase in ρ reduces unemployment.
In equilibrium, for this parameterization, the indirect channel is stronger
than the direct one. Interestingly, the vacancy rate is nonmonotonic in ρ.
Higher values of ρ drive down the number of good jobs created, and increase
the number of bad jobs. When considering aggregate vacancies, for low
values of ρ, the second eﬀect outweighs the ﬁrst. This switches with higher
values of ρ. Thus, for lower values of ρ, unemployment and vacancies move
in opposite directions as ρ changes; whereas, for higher values, they move
in the same direction. Locally at the baseline point, they move in opposite
directions.16
Once again, the measures of dispersion behave in diﬀerent ways. The
σlogw statistic is hump-shaped as ρ increases, reaching a maximum to the
left of the baseline point. The log 90− log 10 statistic is strictly decreasing
in ρ. As above, at the baseline, both move in the same direction.
4.3.3 Changes in the productivity of bad jobs y1
y1 120 130 140 150 160 170 180
φ1 .0224 .0839 .1286 .1658 .1983 .2278 .2550
φ2 .0772 .0752 .0732 .0711 .0690 .0668 .0645
φ̂2 .0577 .0558 .0538 .0517 .0496 .0474 .0450
W 258.63 255.03 254.55* 254.88 255.59 256.53 257.64
U 8.65 5.75 4.68 4.08 3.69 3.40 3.18
V 1.02 1.29 1.41 1.47 1.52 1.56 1.59
σlogw .3149 .3311* .3230 .3100 .2957 .2809 .2661
90-10 1.2793 1.2009 1.1169 1.0344 .9458 .8632 .7855
This table shows how the values of the variables change as y1 ranges from
120 to 180. Exactly as one should expect, larger values of y1 induce more
entry of bad jobs, and reduce the entry of good jobs. Due to the fact that
most workers are in good jobs in equilibrium, changes in the productivity of
bad jobs do not aﬀect the mean wage by much (in the table a 17% change
in y1 induces only a 1.6% change in W . Also, the mean wage follows a U
shape as y1 increases. This reﬂects the changing mix of wages (contract
16 In a matching model with stochastic separation rates, Shimer (2004) ﬁnds that un-
employment and vacancies move, counterfactually, in the same direction. This opens the
possibility that, if his model were extended to allow for more than one type of job, this
counterfactual correlation could be reversed.
25
dispersion) for diﬀerent y1 values. At the baseline point, however, the mean
wage is increasing in y1. The unemployment rate falls as the number of
low quality jobs increases. Thus, unemployment decreases as y1 increases.
Similarly, the vacancy rate follows the number of bad jobs created (the fall
in good vacancies, as y1 increases, is more than oﬀset by the rise in bad
vacancies) and the vacancy rate rises with y1. Changes in y1, therefore,
unemployment and vacancies move in opposite directions.17
Once again, the σlogw statistic is hump shaped, while the log 90− log 10
statistic is strictly decreasing in y1. At the baseline, both are decreasing.
This is intuitive — as y1 approaches y2, we expect dispersion to decrease.
4.3.4 Changes in the productivity of good jobs y2
y2 975 1000 1025 1050 1075 1100 1125
φ1 .2286 .2022 .1774 .1533 .1295 .1054 .0807
φ2 .0562 .0628 .0686 .0738 .0787 .0832 .0874
φ̂2 .0368 .0434 .0491 .0544 .0593 .0638 .0680
W 200.67 222.14 244.14 266.63 289.58 313.04 337.13
U 3.50 3.71 3.96 4.23 4.56 4.96 5.48
V 1.55 1.52 1.49 1.45 1.41 1.35 1.28
σlogw .2670 .2884 .3041 .3154 .3226 .3256* .3238
90− 10 .7168 .8549 .9790 1.0827 1.1684 1.2475 1.3205
This table shows how the values of the variables change as y2 ranges from
975 to 1125. Intuitively, larger values of y2 are associated with more entry
of good jobs, both for unemployed and employed workers. This drives down
the number of bad jobs. Also, the mean wage is strictly increasing, and very
sensitive to, the value of y2: a 15% increase in y2 induces a 68% increase
in W . The unemployment rate, once again, is aﬀected predominantly by
the number of bad jobs: increases in the productivity of good jobs increase
the unemployment rate. Similarly, vacancies are decreasing in y2, as the fall
in entry of bad jobs more than oﬀsets the increase in entry of good jobs
over the range considered. Thus, changes in y2 move unemployment and
vacancies in opposite directions.
The σlogw statistic is hump-shaped once again, but with the peak above
the baseline point — so increasing at the baseline. The log 90−log 10 statistic
is strictly increasing as y2 increases. Intutively, inequality increases as the
distance between y1 and y2 increases.
18
17This accords with the results found in Shimer (2004). He also ﬁnds that changes in
productivity primarily aﬀect wages — a result not found in this table. However, we do ﬁnd
this result when we consider changes in y2.
18 If we associate good jobs with jobs that require the usage of skills (which, in this
environment, all workers have but only use in good jobs) then we can interpret an increase
in y2 (ceteris paribus) as skill-biased technological change. Thus, the model predicts that
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4.3.5 Changes in the vacancy cost of bad jobs k1
k1 1300 1350 1400 1450 1500 1550 1600
φ1 .2103 .1953 .1805 .1657 .1510 .1361 .1210
φ2 .0961 .0698 .0705 .0711 .0718 .0725 .0732
φ̂2 .0517 .0517 .0517 .0517 .0517 .0517 .0517
W 254.56 254.64 254.75 254.88 255.03 255.22 255.46
U 3.55 3.71 3.89 4.08 4.30 4.55 4.84
V 1.54 1.52 1.50 1.47 1.45 1.42 1.39
σlogw .3087 .3092 .3097 .3100 .3103 .3104* .3103
90− 10 1.0106 1.0182 1.0261 1.0344 1.0407 1.0457 1.0505
This table shows how the values of the variables change as k1 ranges
from 1300 to 1600. As noted in the proof of Proposition 2, the entry of good
jobs aimed at currently employed workers is independent of the value of k1.
This is a direct implication of the fact that vacancies created to go after
employed workers only do not compete directly with low type vacancies.
However, as expected, the entry of bad jobs decreases and the entry of good
jobs (aimed at unemployed workers) increases with k1. The average wage,
which responds mostly to the number of good jobs, increases a small amount:
a 23% increase in k1 induces only a 0.35% increase inW . The unemployment
rate, which responds mostly to the number of bad jobs, increases with k1
— by more than a full percentage point over the range. The vacancy rate
falls as k1 increases — so unemployment and vacancies move in opposite
directions.
The σlogw statistic is hump-shaped once again, with the peak above the
baseline point — so increasing at the baseline. The log 90 − log 10 statistic
is strictly increasing as k1 increases. Intuitively, increases in k1 encourage
the entry of good jobs, depress the entry of bad jobs, and raise inequality
measures locally.
this type of technological change would would increase residual wage dispersion. We thank
Alok Kumar for suggesting this interpretation.
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4.3.6 Changes in the vacancy cost of good jobs k2
k2 70000 72000 74000 75399 77000 79000 81000
φ1 .0951 .1229 .1486 .1658 .1848 .2080 .2311
φ2 .0857 .0803 .0750 .0711 .0667 .0610 .0551
φ̂2 .0647 .0600 .0552 .0517 .0477 .0425 .0370
W 306.08 286.64 267.79 254.88 240.36 222.62 205.32
U 5.15 4.66 4.29 4.08 3.88 3.67 3.48
V 1.32 1.39 1.44 1.47 1.50 1.53 1.55
σlogw .3151 .3169* .3142 .3100 .3032 .2914 .2755
90− 10 1.2213 1.1561 1.0866 1.0344 .9572 .8545 .7436
This table shows how the values of the variables change as k2 ranges from
70000 to 81000. As expected, increases in the cost of good vacancies reduce
the entry of these vacancies, both for employed and unemployed workers.
The entry of bad jobs responds positively to ﬁll the gap. The loss of good
jobs drives down the average wage, and the increase of bad jobs reduces the
unemployment rate and drives up the aggregate vacancy rate. Once again,
unemployment and vacancy rates move in opposite directions. The σlogw
statistic is hump-shaped, and the hump is to the left of the baseline point.
The log 90−log 10 statistic is strictly decreasing in k2. Thus, at the baseline,
both measures of inequality fall as the cost of good jobs increases.
4.3.7 Equilibria without On-the-job Search
When k2 is driven up beyond the upper bound in part (a) of Proposition 2,
into the range identiﬁed in part (b), (k2 = 89676.58 for this parameteriza-
tion) on-the-job search is choked oﬀ. As conjectured in Section 3.4 above,
this induces a signiﬁcant decrease in the number of high productivity jobs
oﬀered (φ2 = 0.0163) and increase in the number of low productivity jobs
(φ1 = 0.3626). In this case, average wages fall to $132.87, the unemploy-
ment rate falls to 2.8%, and the vacancy rate falls to 1.05%. Since most
jobs are of one type in this equilibrium (n1 = 0.9307) both measures of
inequality drop precipitously: the σlogw statistic and the log 90− log 10 fall
to 0.0698 and 0.1585 respectively. Going further, and driving k1 beyond the
upper bound in part (a) of Proposition 2, into the range identiﬁed in part
(c), (k1 = 4242.07) so that no low productivity jobs are created, drives down
inequality even more.19 We conclude from this that both technology disper-
19 In Julien, Kennes, and King (2003) we calibrate a model with only one type of job, so
that it matches the mean wage and the unemployment rate. Although some wage disparity
exists in the equilibrium of that model, due to contract dispersion, quantitatively it is
quite small. For example, the σlogw statistic is only 0.01.
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sion and on-the-job search are important for the quantitative performance
of this model as a theory of wage dispersion.
5 Conclusions
According to this analysis, a simple lack of coordination among employers,
when choosing workers to approach for jobs, could be responsible for much
of the wage dispersion that we observe among narrowly deﬁned groups of
workers. In this model, if employers are able to coordinate on any of the
multiplicity of pure strategy equilibria then all workers are paid their out-
side option, all jobs are of the same type, and no dispersion exists. In the
absence of this coordination the unique symmetric mixed strategy equilib-
rium, arguably, represents a focal point.20 In this equilibrium we observe
signiﬁcant dispersion — comparable to that observed empirically. Viewed in
this light, the two-thirds of “unexplained” wage dispersion can be attributed
largely to plain luck on the part of workers.
The analysis also suggests that, in the absence of risk aversion, unless
policymakers are willing and able to somehow coordinate employers, the al-
location is as eﬃcient as it can be. It should be noted also that this absence
of coordination favors workers — and policies designed to coordinate would
have redistributive consequences. This eﬃciency result, now commonplace
in “directed search” models such as this, is quite diﬀerent from results de-
rived in “undirected search” with heterogeneous jobs.21 This is one of the
key diﬀerences in these approaches.
In the presence of risk aversion, a clear potential role for policy arises.
The challenge becomes to design policies that can eliminate some of the
risk without reducing the allocative eﬃciency of the equilibrium. We look
forward to future research that tackles this issue.
20Montgomery (1991), citing Tirole (1986), also argues that mixed strategy equilibria
can be viewed as “reduced form” pure strategy Bayesian equilibria where players have “a
little” private information.
21See, for example, Acemoglu (2001), Davis (2001), and the discussion in Ljungquist
and Sargent (2000).
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
First, using equations (3.9)-(3.12) to ﬁnd Λ2 − Λ1, and equation (3.19), we
ﬁnd the following condition determining φ̂2:
eφ̂2 = β (1− ρ) φ̂2 + β (1− ρ) +
y2 − y1
k2
(A.1)
This equation is of the form ex = ax+ b, where a and b are constants. Let
b̂2 = β(1− ρ) + (y2 − y1)/k2 and â2 = β(1− ρ) < 1 to write equation (A.1)
as:
eφ̂2 = â2φ̂2 + b̂2 (A.2)
Using equations (3.17)-(3.19), one obtains: (k2 − k1)e
−φ̂2 = e−φ̂2, or
φ2 − φ̂2 = − ln
(
k2 − k1
k2
)
> 0 (A.3)
Let γ = ln
(
k2−k1
k2
)
, so that equation (A.2) can be re-written as: φ̂2 = φ2+γ.
Then use this in equation (A.1) to get:
eφ2+γ = β (1− ρ) (φ2 + γ) + β (1− ρ) +
y2 − y1
k2
eφ2 = e−γ
(
β (1− ρ)φ2 + β (1− ρ) (1 + γ) +
y2 − y1
k2
)
Now, since e−γ = k2
k2−k1
, this equation can be written as:
eφ2 = β (1− ρ)
k2
k2 − k1
φ2 + β (1− ρ) (1 + γ)
k2
k2 − k1
+
y2 − y1
k2 − k1
Now, deﬁning a2 = β (1− ρ)
k2
k2−k1
and b2 = β (1− ρ) (1 + γ)
k2
k2−k1
+ y2−y1
k2−k1
,
we can re-write this equation as:
eφ2 = a2φ2 + b2 (A.4)
Now use equations (3.9)-(3.11) to obtain:
Λ2 − Λ0 =
y2 − β(1− β)(1− ρ)V
1− β(1− ρ)
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Using equations (3.10) and (3.11) to ﬁnd Λ2 − Λ1, and equation (3.12) to
ﬁnd V , substitute these into equation (3.18) to get:
eφ1 =
β(1− ρ)
eφ2
φ1 +
y1 + β(1− ρ)k2(φ2 − φ̂2)
k1eφ2
(A.5)
With φ̂2 and φ2 determined in equations (A.2) and (A.4) respectively, the
values a1 =
β(1−ρ)
eφ2
and b1 =
y1+β(1−ρ)k2(φ2−φ̂2)
k1e
φ2
are constants, and we may
write:
eφ1 = a1φ1 + b1 (A.6)
Lemma Let x∗ solve ex
∗
= ax∗ + b, where a and b are constants, then
there exists
1. a unique x∗ = 0 if f a ≤ 1 and b ≤ 1.
2. two solutions x∗ = 0 and x∗ > 0 if f 1 < a <∞ and b ≤ 1.
3. a unique x∗ > 0 if f a <∞ and b > 1.
To prove part (a) of the Proposition, we can use part (3) of the Lemma.
Clearly, â2 < ∞, and ai < ∞, i = 1, 2. Thus, unique solutions φ̂2 > 0,
φ2 > 0, and φ1 > 0 exist iﬀ
b̂2 > 1 ⇐⇒
y2 − y1
1− β(1− ρ)
> k2and
b2 > 1 ⇐⇒ k2 <
y2 − y1 + k1
1− β(1− ρ)(1 + γ)
and
b1 > 1 ⇐⇒ k1 <
(
y1 + β(1− ρ)k2(φ2 − φ̂2)
)
e−φ2
Since γ ∈ (−1, 0), it follows that
y2 − y1
1− β(1− ρ)
<
y2 − y1 + k1
1− β(1− ρ)(1 + γ)
and
so
y2 − y1
1− β(1− ρ)
> k2 is the binding constraint on k2.
For part (b) of the Proposition, we ﬁrst use part (1) of the Lemma.
Clearly, â2 = β(1− ρ) < 1 Hence, there exists a unique solution φ̂2 = 0
iﬀ:
b̂2 ≤ 1 ⇐⇒
y2 − y1
1− β(1− ρ)
≤ k2
We now use part (3) of the Lemma. Clearly, ai <∞, i = 1, 2
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Hence, there exist unique solutions φ1 > 0 and φ2 > 0 iﬀ
b1 > 1 ⇐⇒ k1 <
(
y1 + β(1− ρ)k2(φ2 − φ̂2)
)
e−φ2 and
b2 > 1 ⇐⇒ k2 <
y2 − y1 + k1
1− β(1− ρ)(1 + γ)
Since γ ∈ (−1, 0), it follows that
y2 − y1
1− β(1− ρ)
<
y2 − y1 + k1
1− β(1− ρ)(1 + γ)
for
all k1, k2. Therefore, k2 ∈
[
y2 − y1
1− β(1− ρ)
,
y2 − y1 + k1
1− β(1− ρ)(1 + γ)
]
⇐⇒ 0 =
φ̂2 < φ2.
For part (c) of the Proposition, we ﬁrst use part (1) of the Lemma.
Clearly, â2 = β(1− ρ) < 1 and a1 =
β(1−ρ)
eφ2
< 1
Hence, there exists unique solutions φ̂2 = 0 and φ1 = 0 iﬀ:
b̂2 ≤ 1 ⇐⇒
y2 − y1
1− β(1− ρ)
≤ k2
b1 ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ k1 ≥
(
y1 + β(1− ρ)k2(φ2 − φ̂2)
)
e−φ2
We now use part (3) of the Lemma. Clearly, a2 = β (1− ρ)
k2
k2−k1
<∞.
Hence there exists a unique solution φ2 > 0 iﬀ
b2 > 1 ⇐⇒ k2 <
y2 − y1 + k1
1− β(1− ρ)(1 + γ)
Since γ ∈ (−1, 0), it follows that
y2 − y1
1− β(1− ρ)
<
y2 − y1 + k1
1− β(1− ρ)(1 + γ)
for all k1, k2.Therefore, k2 ∈
[
y2 − y1
1− β(1− ρ)
,
y2 − y1 + k1
1− β(1− ρ)(1 + γ)
]
⇐⇒ 0 =
φ̂2 < φ2.
For part (d) of the Proposition, we ﬁrst use part (1) of the Lemma.
Clearly, â2 = β(1− ρ) < 1. Hence, there exists a unique solution φ2 = 0
iﬀ
b̂2 ≤ 1 ⇐⇒
y2 − y1
1− β(1− ρ)
≤ k2
We now use part (3) of the Lemma. Clearly, a1 =
β(1−ρ)
eφ2
< 1 <∞.
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Hence there exists a unique solution φ1 > 0 iﬀ
b1 > 1 ⇐⇒ k1 <
(
y1 + β(1− ρ)k2(φ2 − φ̂2)
)
e−φ2
We now use part (1) of the Lemma again. For φ2 = 0 we need
b2 ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ k2 ≥
y2 − y1 + k1
1− β(1− ρ)(1 + γ)
We also need a2 = β (1− ρ)
k2
k2−k1
≤ 1. This condition is re-written as
k2 ≥
k1
1−β(1−ρ) .
Since
k1
1− β(1− ρ)
<
y2 − y1 + k1
1− β(1− ρ)(1 + γ)
then this condition is satisﬁed
when k2 ≥
y2 − y1 + k1
1− β(1− ρ)(1 + γ)
.
6.2 Proof of the Corollary
This follows directly from equation (A.3) above. 
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